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reflectiveness suspends and re-directs organic life, a theory of the interplay of these 
ontological realms is possible and necessary, but not in the direction marked by these 
authors. 
ANGEL MEDINA 
Georgia State University 
KAREEN MALONE 
Duquesne University 
Wi l l i am  Barrett, The Illusion of Technique: A Search for Meaning in a 
Technological Civilizatian. Garden  City, N e w  York  : Anchor  P ress /Doub le -  
day, 1978. xx ~+ 359 pp. $12.95. 
By now Barrett's book has been reviewed in nearly twenty popular and learned periodi- 
cals. 1 Apparently Barrett has the attention of the larger intellectual community in this 
country. In this regard he belongs to a very small group of contemporary American 
philosophers which is comprised of such thinkers as Hannah Arendt, Thomas Kuhn, 
Herbert Marcuse, and John Rawls. 2 Barrett's thought does not have the seminal force 
of his well-known colleagues. Still the tone of most of the reviews shows that Barrett 
enjoys not only attention but also respect. It is noteworthy, however, that the reviews 
that have been written by noted colleagues of Barrett's show some reserve and 
occasionally Scorn. 3 That suggests that Barrett's book is of interest not only for the 
sake of its theses and arguments but also as a focus of the question how contemporary 
American philosophy is related to the intellectual character and direction of this 
country. 
The title of the book which seems to promise an essay in the philosophy of tech- 
nology may be misleading since the avowed purpose of the book is to present % study 
of contemporary philosophy" (xvi) which is at the same time "an attempt at a 
connected argument for freedom" (xvii).* Barrett has chosen Wittgenstein, Heidegger, 
and James as representatives of contemporary philosophy, and in this choice he is 
remarkably close to a colleague of a very different temperament, Richard Rorty, who 
calls Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey "the richest and most original philosophers 
of our time. ' '5 
Let me begin with a brief survey of Barrett's presentations. The book is divided 
into four parts. The first, entitled "Technique," begins with a chapter that sets forth 
the origin and dissolution of "The Illusion of a Technique," i.e., the rise of symbolic 
logic and its application as a technique for solving all philosophical problems. Barrett 
points to the diverging developments of the founding fathers of this project, Russell, 
Whitehead, and Wittgenstein, as evidence of the failure of this technique. This leads 
in the second chapter to general remarks about "Technique, Technicians, and 
Philosophy." Technique is first defined as ritual and then, in the modern case, said 
to be assimilated by technology. "Technology is embodied technique." (I8) The tie 
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to logic is established by calling a machine "an embodied decision procedure" (20). 
The relation of technique and technology to philosophy is twofold. Technology on 
the one side "is the late, and maybe the final offspring of philosophy" (22). On the 
other, philosophy despite the failure of technique outlined in chapter one remains in 
the thrall of technique. The lesson has not been learned and requires further considera- 
tion. Chapter three therefore gives an exposition of the Tractatus and argues that the 
claim made for logic (that it mirrors the structure of the world) is unfounded and 
that the atomism to which the Tractatus is committed must lead to a denial of genuine 
freedom. But as the fourth chapter points out, "Mysticism" is as much part of the 
Tractatus as logic and rigor, though silence is all that Wittgenstein suggests as a 
response to the mystical side of the world. The later Wittgenstein breaks through the 
confines of the Traclatus and acknowledges "Open Language" though he still remains 
bound to simple and austere aspects of the world and sheds little light on the problem 
of freedom as chapter five presents it. In the sixth chapter, "Mathematics, Mechanism, 
and Creativity," Barrett proceeds to Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics. He 
argues that Russell's attempt to reduce mathematics to logic was misconceived and 
failed. G6del's theorem and similar ones show "that human creativity exceeds any 
mechanism in whi:h it might seek to contain its own constructs" (93)- Wittgenstein 
recognized the openness of mathematics and suggested that it be looked at as a network 
of human norms and conventions though he fails to ask what should determine these 
conventions. 
The arguments so far, Barrett says, have shown the inherent limitations of technique. 
He now proceeds to place technique as embodied in technology in the context of 
"Being," the title of part two. In chapter seven, Barrett departs from "The Two 
Worlds," the one disclosed by science, the other the one we live in and experience. 
Descartes is said to have established the diremption of the two worlds for the modern 
era. Husserl tried to reestablish the unity of the world by exploring the intentional 
acts through which things come to be present. But holding to the division of essence 
and existence and making consciousness the highest court of appeal, Husserl bars 
himself from being and from the force of existence as it thrusts itself upon conscious- 
ness. Chapter eight, "Homeless in the World," develops its topic by presenting a 
discussion and close illustrations of the notions of being-in-the-world, truth, and being 
as put forward in Heidegger's Being and Time. "The Cash Value of Being" is argued 
in chapter nine by pointing up how in Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's treatment of 
language being is at issue. Chapter ten outlines modern history of philosophy as the 
prelude and institution of "Technology as Human Destiny." In the final chapter of 
part two, "Utopia or Oblivion," Barrett urges that the metaphysics of technology is 
enacted and accepted in everyday life as is the radical subjectivity which is part  of 
that metaphysics. 
Part three, entitled "Freedom," begins in chapter twelve with the argument that 
"The Moral Wil l"  and religion are at the center of a personality and that Heidegger 
in spite of his reflections on freedom and death was unable to reach that center. 
Chapter thirteen introduces James as the thinker who asserts the freedom of the will 
and is willing to acknowledge the force of religion. Yet James, as chapter fourteen 
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indicates, never speaks from within "The Faith to Will," i.e., from the experience 
of the advent of faith. The final part of the book turns to the question of "The Shape 
of the Future ?" It begins with "The Shape of the Future: American Version" 
(chapter fifteen). Barrett sees its outlines in B. F. Skinner's writings, Walden Two 
in particular. He finds Skinner's determinism erroneous and perhaps morally debili- 
tating. Chapter sixteen, "The Shape of the Future : Russian Version," argues that the 
Marxist analysis of society and its prediction of the rise of a classless society have 
been reduced to absurdity by the developments in Russia since the revolution. The 
book concludes with an Epilogue, "Nihilism, Faith, Freedom," in which Barrett 
testifies to his pra:tice of faith in the gesture of crossing himself and to his discovery 
of tranquillity in the contemplation of nature. 
Barrett's systematic concern is with technique and freedom; his historical concern 
is with Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and James. These concerns are interwoven, of course; 
but an initial division will be helpful for the critical part of this review. Technique 
is first introduced and defined by Barrett in connection with logic and mathematics. 
Technique in this case is the attempt to reduce (areas of) mathematics, language, and 
philosophical problems to axiomatic systems. G(Jdel and others have shown that this 
enterpr.;se has inherent limitations in regard to certain formal systems. From this 
generally accepted fact Barrett draws two conclusions. First, G6del's result is evidence 
for human freedom. To appreciate Barrett's position one must look at his procedure. 
Barrett throughout his book converses with the great figures of modern and 
contemporary philosophy. But he quite ignores or is ignorant of the details of the 
philosophical discussions that are now going on in this country or elsewhere. His 
sweeping dismissals of contemporary philosophy are therefore unconvincing (i2, 23-24, 
i7i ,  215). What is more disturbing is the fact that he repeatedly rests his case on 
arguments or theses which appear doubtful, to say the least, in light of present 
controversies. Serious objections have, e.g., been raised against the claim that G6del's 
theorem shows that man is more than a me:hanism. 6 
Barrett's second conclusion says that technique has inherent limitations. But what 
is technique, generally speaking ? In the chapter that begins with the question "What 
is a te:hnique ?'" Barrett starts with the general notion of technique as ritual, then 
restricts it is the modern case by saying that technique is here absorbed by technology. 
Technology seems to be the ensemble of machines that surrounds us. The logical 
essence of the machine, in turn, lies in its being "an embodied decision procedure." The 
point is suggestive, but it remains vague. In what sense is a machine an embodied 
decis'on procedure ? "When your car starts up in the morning, it is solving a problem 
by going through a number of prescribed steps," Barrett says (2o). The point that 
he seems to emphasize is that one certain input will always result in one certain 
output. One can certainly think of an embodied decision procedure as an input-output- 
system. But unlike a motor that is being started, such a system accepts and produces 
infinitely many different inputs and outputs of a certain sort. There are also machines, 
embodying negative feedback loops, which produce one and the same output in 
response to different inputs of a certain kind. Does Barrett want to exclude those ? 
Or does he merely want to say that machines are problem solvers ? Then how do they 
Book reviews 461 
differ from plants and animals ? Or from lakes considered as thermal systems ? Again 
there is a large body of contempora~7 writings on the topic under the titles of 
functionalism and systems theory.7 It has not left a trace in Barrett's book. Presumably 
it belongs to the "so-called technical publications of philosophy" where the philosopher 
"immerses himself in hair-splitting debates" (23). Yet along with the sterility of 
much of technical philosophy Barrett dismisses features which would be necessary to 
give his theses force : rigor and coherence. Rorty who also considers much of modern 
and contemporary philosophy fruitless, has furnished many pages of closely reasoned 
arguments to establish his claim. Barrett sometimes assures us that he could provide 
details and evidence for his grand theses (I98, 2r6).  But his book contains no 
sustained argument in support of a controversial or original point that would extend 
over more than two pages. 
Two of the four parts of the book end with conclusions which apparently are 
intended to bring the direction and force of the foregoing chapters into relief, s They 
illustrate the shortcomings of Barrett's style. The "Conclusion to Part I" advances the 
relation between freedom and techniques as the governing concern of the book. 
Immediately the problem of the technology of behavior and the claims made by its 
proponents are brought up. This is followed by % small story" of a page and a half 
that "may be to the point" ( i o i ) .  After two pages of various comments on behav- 
iorism, Barrett says: "The Business of conditioning people, however, has been a 
subsidiary issue in this first section." ( Io5)  In fact it has hardly been an issue at alI. 
The "Conclusion" then comes quickly to an end when Barrett announces that in the 
next part technique will be cons'tiered in a broader context (IO5-6). 
In the "Conclusion to Part II," Barrett acknowledges that the first two parts are at 
odds with one another since the first claims that technique has inherent limitations 
whereas the second argues that the technical order "seems to brook no inherent 
limitations to technique" (222). The inconsistency is not as stark as it might seem. 
Even if one were to accept the theses of part one, they would not yield anything like 
a clear and fruitful paradigm of technique which could be applied to and tested 
against the social order. And it is not really true that "Part II has dealt with 
technique as it is factually and concretely embodied in our actual technology," as 
Barrett claims. Part two consists of the usual sequence of aphorisms, stories, and 
sketches only one of which intermittently gives an account of a concrete situation 
(z35-54). Still, to the extent that the first two parts have a discernible direction of 
arguments, there is the inconsistency that Barrett notes. But if one expects the 
"Conclusion to Part II" to resolve the inconsistency or to set the stage for a resolution 
in a later part, he will be disappointed. Barrett at once gets diverted into an elaboration 
of the second conjunct of the contradiction. This leads to a discussion of Heidegger's 
method of analyzing the framework of technology. Barrett then notes that the frame- 
work is threatened by nuclear destruction and that it is a moral question whether or 
not that danger is met. But Heidegger's thought does not enter the realm of ethics and 
religion according to Barrett. This prompts the turn to James. The book gives an 
appearance of connectedness because the end of a chapter as a rule takes explicit note 
of the title and beginning of the following chapter. But the materials within each 
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chapter are loosely assembled. 
Barrett's other and chief systematic theme is freedom. He defends human freedom 
against all endeavors to coerce and enslave man and urges that he be provided with 
the fullest opportunities to develop his abilities. So far Barrett is clearly in accord with 
all philosophers and social scientists in this country if not in the world. The crucial 
philosophical question is whether the theoretical underpinnings of the practical 
program require a notion of free action understood as uncaused action. Barrett clearly 
thinks so and he is partly aware that the determinist does not. But to an important 
side of the determinist position he is often blind. Barrett draws support for his 
libertarian view from alleged practical differences with the determinist. Barrett, so he 
says, wants the individual to flourish whereas the determinist debilitates, deceives, 
and wants to coerce him (xv, IIS, 297, 3o2, 3o8). If coercion means forcible or 
punitive action, one will nowhere find support for it in Skinner's writings. The 
determinist does not want to fight or repress freedom. His point is rather that there 
simply is no such thing as freedom if by that we mean the ability to act against or 
independently of causal determination. What  the determinists fight against is the 
persistent illusion of freedom as uncausedness. Some do it because they think this 
illusion bespeaks a theoretical confusion, others do it because they believe the illusion 
to be practically pernicious. And among the latter, Skinner is one of the most vocal. 
One must remember however that there is a large area of agreement between 
libertarians and determinists about important practical matters such as social justice, 
the police powers of the state, foreign policy, the arms race, and others. And in most 
cases where there is disagreement, it is not in any strict sense traceable to different 
views on freedom and determinism. The determinist would explain his large practical 
agreement with the libertarian by arguing that most libertarian views and programs 
are deterministically reconstructed rather than dissolved or refuted. There is of course 
controversy also about the limits and the practical force of such reconstructions. But 
the controversy can be fruitfully entered and advanced only if one is ready to under- 
take the necessary conceptual and theoretical analyses. When Barrett attempts this, 
he acts as though certain theses against determinism need only be stated and illustrated 
to be incontrovertible, e.g., the thesis that the "determinist has secured an unassailable 
position for himself at the expense of making it empty" (26o) or the thesis that the 
determinist must somewhere presuppose a free, i.e., undetermined choice (299-300). 
Having thus convicted the determinist in general and Skinner in particular, he feels 
entitled to claim that it "is surely harmful, particularly in the present climate of 
opinion, to deprive people altogether of the notion of moral autonomy" (302) and 
to brand the behavioral scientist's attitude as "callous cynicism" (308). But to one 
who is familiar with the philosophical debates about freedom and determinism Bar- 
rett's arguments must seem naive, ineffective, and merely rhetorical. 
I now turn to Barrett's discussion of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and James. On Witt- 
genstein, Barrett presents the standard view of the turn from the Tractatus to the 
Investigations. He takes note also of Wittgenstein's writings on mathematics, but I 
am not competent to put Barrett's discussion in the context of the philosophy of 
mathematics. And, perhaps most distinctively, Barrett draws on the personal back- 
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ground and circumstances of Wittgenstein's life to reveal in his writings the work 
of a "modern" whose life is a point of convergence of the conflicts of modernism 
(~4). Heidegger is the most prominent thinker in Barrett's book. From him Barrett 
adopts three positions. The first is the view of history as a conversation among the 
great thinkers and of the thoughts so articulated as a circumscription of an epoch and 
a prefiguration of what is eventually acted out in practice. The second is the claim 
that the unacknowledged but always decisive theme of the epochal conversations is 
being. Third, Barrett like Heidegger, sees technology as the shape that being has taken 
on in the modern era. 
The first of these positions is the least conspicuous. Barrett gives a sketch of 
Heidegger's position (2o3-4), but he makes no issue of his adoption of that position 
(though he is usually very explicit about his relation to Heidegger and others). It is 
also the most pervasive and consequential attitude since it gives the book its tempera- 
ment. I will come back to it. Regarding the second point, I think Barrett, claiming 
that Heidegger was intent "on the single theme of Being" (242), misjudges the 
significance of being in Heidegger's thought. Being in Being and Time is best under- 
stood as the watchword of a call to radical philosophizing, and being in this sense 
surely has disclosive power. But what is disclosed in the pursuit of being remains 
ambiguous. This is borne out by the passage in chapter eight where Barrett presents 
the course of a day in the conceptual framework (the existentialia) of Being and Time 
(I35-54). The result is inconclusive. The application of Being and Time to everyday 
matters often amounts to nothing more than the addition of a rhetorical exclamation 
mark to the trivial, ambiguous, or banal. Barrett himself remarks on the incompleteness 
of Heidegger's analyses of human existence. "Dasein has no soul," he says (234). But 
this intuition is not tested and worked out. I am not sure it is enough for a philosopher 
to leave it at that, conceding that "even now I find no more concise and compelling 
way in which to put my judgment" (234). 'Being' remained a questionable vocable for 
Heidegger throughout his career. He went from one spelling (Sein) to another (Seyn)9 
He crossed the word out. Io Finally he remarked : " . . .  I do not like to use the word 
anymore . . . " I1 This is more than a fine point of doxography. The word 'being' 
became dispensable as the enterprise of Heidegger's thought turned from radicality to 
simplicity, to the concreteness of such essays as "The Thing" or "Building, Dwelling, 
Thinking." x2 In Barrett's use, 'being' is opaque. He uses the term to castigate philoso- 
phers and ordinary folk who are concerned merely with beings (xix, W5, ,83, 291). 
But what precisely is being neglected by such people remains as clouded as the 
meaning of being itself. To be sure, in the last essay that Heidegger published, it 
seems, as the title "Time and Being" suggests, that he takes up again the question of 
being. Is But the concern of the essay is with what gives time and being. Here the 
question of God arises, x~ And it does so in a much more systematic and central way 
than in the asides of Heidegger's that Barrett considers (244-45). The question of 
God had to be close to Heidegger whose attachment to the tradition in which he grew 
up is well-known. That tradition was thoroughly Christian. And there are enough 
documents to show how Heidegger slowly found his way back into the vicinity of that 
tradition. Is As Barrett tells us, he has been through Being and Time many times 
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(233). But of the later Heidegger he seems to have a fragmentary knowledge only 
and none, it appears, of the secondary material which throws light on the religious 
dimension of the later He~degger's thought. 
Finally, Barrett often states and makes use of I-Ieidegger's thesis that technology 
is today's dominant character of reality (xiii, 8, 177-219). But he does nothing to 
discuss and resolve the liabilities of that view, and he finally discards it when he notes 
the danger of a nuclear catastrophe as evidence of the primacy of politics and ethics 
over technology as understood by FIeidegger (233-24). But in so doing Barrett surely 
misses Heidegger's understanding of technology. Heidegger says expressly that 
technology is much more uncanny and perilous than the danger of a nuclear catas- 
trophe. 1~ Heidegger may be wrong; but his point should not be ignored. 
The least one would learn from Heidegger (and not from him alone) is that in a 
technological age the questions of politics, morality, and religion must be raised in a 
new way if they are to be raised fruitfully. But Barrett turns to these questions in a 
traditional and abstract and finally inconsequential way. I have mentioned the bald 
transition that Barrett makes from the problem of technology by way of politics to 
that of morality. Having arrived at the moral issue, Barrett has little more to offer 
than the insistence that "the moral will is the center of the personality" (233). He 
then escalates what he mockingly calls the odd, simpleminded, tame, prosaic, stodgy, 
hackneyed, and old-hat character of this position to the status of the great and saving 
simplicity of our age (245-46). And finally, although he has made so much of the 
simplicity of this position and of Kant's influence in establishing it, he urges that we 
"have to burrow into the foundations that Kant, unknown to himself, really took for 
granted" (246). What  in fact follows is another quick transition from morality to 
God, faith, and James (246-47). 
James is repeatedly said to have a crucial place in the book because "his bold 
adventure into religious belief" gives us access to an area that remains closed to 
Wittgenstein and Heidegger (xvii; cf. ix-xx and 247). Yet finally Barrett admits that 
James "never speaks from within faith" (272). He questions the helpfulness of 
James' findings (274) and argues that James misunderstands the mystic dimension of 
faith (288-94). The discussion of James turns out to be pointless. 
But do not all these criticisms press Barrett's thought into the professional mold 
that he is at pains to explode ? And does not the wide and respectful reception of 
the book show that it is illuminating beyond the power and limits of most professional 
philosophizing in this country ? I think it is at least true that Barrett's book aspires 
to a concreteness, versatility, sparkle, and largeness of vision that set it off favorably 
against the work of most of his colleagues. Perhaps the need for such philosophizing 
is so great that even a book that professes but falls below these aspirations is well 
received. I am not sure, however, that The Illusion of Technique will leave an imprint 
on the spiritual and intellectual development in this country or anywhere else. Its 
reception has been largely respectful, but the respect has the character of a mild and 
vague approval. No one seems to be profoundly struck, disquieted, enlightened, or 
encouraged. A philosophical book of real consequence will have to manifest the rigor 
and resourcefulness that come to fruition when one tests and elaborates his intuitions 
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against the work of his colleagues as for instance Rawls did in his Theory of Justice. 
If one thinks of such professional work as sterile and distracting, his attitude should 
be warranted by a vision as incisive and fruitful as for instance Heidegger's. Barrett 
speaks courageously of his religious practice and of the strength he draws from the 
commerce with nature (x54, 276-79, 337-40, 345). But as far as they go, these 
professions seem impotent and inconsequential in the face of technology. 
ALBERT BORGMANN 
University of Montana 
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